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Abstract
We report the first active acoustic side-channel attack. Speakers are used to emit human inaudible acoustic signals, and the
echo is recorded via microphones, turning the acoustic system of a smart phone into a sonar system. The echo signal can be
used to profile user interaction with the device. For example, a victim’s finger movements can be inferred to steal Android
unlock patterns. In our empirical study, the number of candidate unlock patterns that an attacker must try to authenticate
herself to a Samsung S4 phone can be reduced by up to 70% using this novel acoustic side-channel. The attack is entirely
unnoticeable to victims. Our approach can be easily applied to other application scenarios and device types. Overall, our work
highlights a new family of security threats.
Keywords Side-channel attack · Acoustic system · Active sonar · Mobile device
1 Introduction
Radar and sonar systems use radio and sound waves to track
objects, including humans. In recent years, this technology
has been developed extensively to support human–computer
interactions by tracking the movement of human bodies,
arms, hands or even fingers [19,22]. However, existing work
has rarely investigated the security implications of those tech-
nologies.
In this paper, we report some alarming security impli-
cations of tracking human movement via sound waves.
Specifically, we present the first active acoustic side-channel
attack1 that can be used to steal sensitive information such
as Android unlock patterns. In our attack, human inaudi-
ble acoustic signals are emitted via speakers and the echo is
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recorded via microphones, turning the acoustic system of a
smart phone into a sonar system. The echo stream not only
gives us information about a victim’s finger movement but
leaks her secrets too.
All known acoustic side-channel attacks are passive,
meaning that acoustic signals in the side-channel are gen-
erated by the victim but are eavesdropped by the attacker.
In contrast, our approach is an active side-channel, meaning
that acoustic signals in the side-channel are induced by the
attacker.
In our experiment, we use an off-the-shelf Android phone
as an example of a computer system with a high-quality
acoustic system. We repurpose the acoustic system for our
side-channel attack. An inaudible signal is emitted via speak-
ers, and the echo is recorded via microphones turning the
acoustic system of the phone into a sonar system. Using
this approach, an attacker that obtains control over a phone’s
speaker and microphone is able to observe user interaction,
such as the movement of the user’s fingers on the touch
screen. As the emitted sound is inaudible for the user, it is
hard to detect that the sound system is being used to gather
information.
To illustrate the capability and potential of this novel
active acoustic side-channel attack, we use the task of steal-
ing Android unlock patterns as a case study. We choose this
example, since Android is a popular phone OS, and since
its unlock patterns are one of the most widely used authen-
tication mechanisms. Our aim is to demonstrate the general
viability of our new acoustic side-channel, not to improve the
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specific task of stealing unlock patterns. It would be inter-
esting future research to compare the effectiveness of our
approach with older methods and to identify the best method
for stealing unlock patterns, but these are beyond the scope
of this paper.
It might appear that our contribution is merely another
phone-based side-channel, among many of those that have
been investigated for smartphones [24]. However, this is
a false impression. Although our experiments are carried
out with a phone, the method we show is applicable to
many other kinds of computing devices and physical envi-
ronments where microphones and speakers are available.
Perhaps more importantly, when examined in the context of
acoustic attacks, our work is particularly significant in that it
is the first active acoustic side-channel to be reported.
Specific contributions of this paper include:
1. SonarSnoop framework We establish the first active
acoustic side-channel attack and present SonarSnoop, the
framework of generic value to construct and implement
such attacks.
2. Unlock pattern stealing We evaluate the performance of
SonarSnoop in stealing unlock patterns and show that
the number of unlock patterns an attacker must try until
a successful authentication can be reduced by up to 70%
using the acoustic side-channel. This attack is entirely
unnoticeable to a victim; no noise and no vibration are
induced.
3. A family of security threats We discuss a number of new
attack scenarios that extend our experiment setting. We
show that SonarSnoop represents a family of new threats.
The next section describes relevant background on phone
unlock patterns, the acoustic side-channel and how to exploit
it for an effective attack. Section 3 describes SonarSnoop,
the system used to spy on user interactions with a phone, dis-
cussing in detail the challenging aspects of signal generation
and signal processing necessary to reveal user interaction.
Section 4 describes our experimental evaluation using a user
study. Specifically, we evaluate the effectiveness of different
decision-making strategies. Section 5 discusses findings and
limitations. Section 6 generalises the SonarSnoop attack and
discusses further attack scenarios, potential countermeasures
and broader implications of acoustic side-channel attacks.
Section 7 describes related work, and Sect. 8 concludes the
paper.
2 Stealing phone unlock patterns via
acoustic side-channel attacks
Unlock patterns are often used to secure access to Android
phones. We investigate a novel active acoustic side-channel
1 2 3 4
5 6 7 8
9 10 11 12
Fig. 1 The twelve most popular unlock patterns according to [10]. An
unlock pattern connects a number of dots, and it can be decomposed
into several strokes separated by inflections
attack to steal these patterns. Previous research investi-
gated different methods for stealing unlock patterns, e.g.
using smudges [2], accelerometer readings [3] or video
footage [30].
2.1 Phone unlock patterns
We consider the unlock pattern mechanism available on
Android phones. The user is presented with a 3 × 3 grid
of positions. Using the touch screen, the user has to draw
a pattern, connecting positions in the correct sequence to
authenticate.
Figure 1 shows some examples of such an unlock pattern.
For the first pattern on the figure, the user has to connect 5
positions on the screen in the correct order starting from the
top left position. The phone is blocked if the user fails to
draw the correct pattern five times in a short period.
The unlock pattern can be decomposed in multiple strokes
which are separated by inflections. Positions that can be
reached without changing drawing direction make up one
stroke. We use this approach of pattern decomposition later
in the paper.
In theory, there are 389, 112 ≈ 219 possible unlock pat-
terns [27]. However, not every pattern is chosen by users with
the same probability. Users have bias in choosing unlock pat-
terns, andmodels have been created to estimate the likelihood
of unlock patterns [27]. This bias can be used by adversaries
to improve their guess on unlock patterns.
Figure 1 gives the 12 most common unlock patterns in the
real world, according to a recent empirical study [10]. In our
user study, we focus on stealing these most likely patterns
only, for the following reasons. First, unlock patterns have a
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highly non-uniform distribution, and those 12 common pat-
terns account formore than 20%of user choices [10].We aim
for these high-priority targets only, just like rational adver-
saries often choose to do. Second, we aim to make our user
study reasonable to participants so that it will not take too
much of their time to complete the study. An overly lengthy
user study will be tedious and boring, and it will scare away
potential participants. In the worst scenario, a bored partic-
ipant can circumvent the study by producing useless data
or otherwise jeopardising our experiment’s validity. Third,
as mentioned earlier, our purpose is not to steal the most
unlock patterns or propose the best experiment of that kind.
Instead, our modest aim is to use an experiment to testify the
feasibility of our acoustic side-channel attack. We believe
our design choice is sufficient for the purpose. Overall, our
design choice is not a random decision, but one based on
careful deliberation, with multiple factors and their trade-off
taken into considerations.
2.2 An acoustic side-channel
The acoustic channel can be used to infer user behaviour
using either a passive or active approach. A passive system
assumes that the observation target itself emits sound that
can be recorded for analysis. An active system uses speakers
to emit a sound wave and microphones to collect echo data.
In this work, we use the active approach. The speakers
of the system emit an orthogonal frequency division mul-
tiplexing (OFDM) sound signal. We use OFDM because it
has a good correlation property [19] and it is easy to con-
fine the signal to the higher inaudible frequency range (see
Sect. 3.3). The sound signal sits in a frequency range that is
inaudible to most people (18–20kHz). The microphones are
used to record the echo. By analysing the recorded echo, it
is possible to deduce user interaction patterns with the touch
screen.
When using this technique during a user’s interaction with
the unlockmechanism, information regarding the unlock pat-
tern is leaked which constitutes the acoustic side-channel.
2.3 Threat model
We consider an adversary’s goal is to steal a user’s unlock
pattern.We assume that the adversary uses software deployed
on the user’s phone to achieve this goal. We further make
the assumption that the adversary uses the acoustic system
(speakers andmicrophones) on the phone to achieve this goal.
We assume the adversary is able to deploy code on the user’s
phone which carries out the acoustic side-channel attack.
Typically, such code might be installed in form of an App.
The adversary may develop an App that incorporates code to
execute the acoustic side-channel attack and presents itself to
the user as a benign App such as a Weather App or a Game.
The existence of Apps with such hidden malicious function-
ality in the Android marketplace is well documented [32,33].
The App will require access to microphones. The user
will be asked to grant access to this when the application is
first launched. Users often grant such access as they rarely
question the necessity of these requests [13]. In addition,
the App might be designed such that this permission seems
reasonable to the user. For example, the App might have
sound effects and offer voice control.
To be effective, the App will have to be active when the
user enters the unlock pattern. Thus, the App has to be run-
ning in the background and become active when the phone
starts.
The App may also make use of available communication
channels to transport observed data to a back-end system.The
back-end system can be used to analyse the acoustic traces,
avoiding suspicious heavy computation on the user’s phone.
Again, such communication falls within normal operational
behaviour of Apps and would not raise suspicion.
The acoustic system is specific to the phone model. Dif-
ferent phones provide a different number of speakers and
microphones, and they are placed differently. Thus, an active
acoustic side-channel attack must be tuned to the model of
the phone. We assume that the adversary is able to obtain the
same phone model as used by the target in order to adjust
signal processing parameters to the target environment.
2.4 Attack success
An adversary is successful if he or she has: (i) deployed
malicious code on the target’s phone; (ii) collected sufficient
data from the acoustic side-channel during the users’ interac-
tion with the unlock mechanism; (iii) analysed the data and
extracted unlock pattern candidates; and (iv) the number of
extracted pattern candidates is smaller than the number of
trials the OS allows.
The challenging parts of this attack sequence include
collecting useful data from the acoustic side-channel and
designing a data analysis framework for inferring unlock
patterns. The next sections will focus on these elements.
We consider the deployment of malicious code on a target’s
phone a solved problem, as is the common practice in the
literature [32,33].
3 SonarSnoop
This section describes SonarSnoop, our framework to exe-
cute an acoustic side-channel attack on the Android phone
unlock pattern.We call the framework SonarSnoop as we use
the acoustic detection to snoop on user interaction, bearing
similaritieswith sonar systems. The system is geared towards
unlock patterns; however, by exchanging elements of the sig-
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nal processing and decision-making components the system
could be repurposed for other side-channel attacks such as
observing user interaction with a banking App.
Our work was inspired by FingerIO [19], which was a
system for user interaction based on active acoustic sonar.
However, FingerIO was used to track movement of gestures
in the vicinity of a phone while our system requires to track
finger movements on the screen. Thus in SonarSnoop, the
close proximity and the fact that the user holds the phone dur-
ing interactions create additional complexity. We also have
tomodify both signal generation and processing to tackle our
attack scenarios.
The speakers of the phone send an inaudible OFDM
sound signal which all objects around the phone reflect.
The microphones receive the signal and also the reflections
(delayed copies of the signal). The time of arrival of all
echoes does not change when objects are static. However,
when an object (a finger) is moving, a shift in arrival times is
observed. The received signals are represented by a so-called
echo profile matrix which visualises this shift and allows
us to observe movement. Combining observed movement
frommultiple microphones allows us to estimate strokes and
inflections (see Fig. 1). By combining the estimated sequence
of observed strokes, we can then estimate the unlock pattern
they represent.
The four main components of SonarSnoop are:
– Signal generation Using the speakers of the phone an
OFDM signal is produced. The signal is inaudible and
suitable for close-range tracking of fingers.
– Data collectionData are collected via the device’smicro-
phones.
– Signal processing Echo profiles are created followed by
removal of noise and artefacts. Then, features (finger
movement direction and distance) are extracted.
– Decision-makingUsing the extracted features, the unlock
patterns (represented by their decomposition in strokes
and inflections) are discovered. We provide alternative
methods to do this.
3.1 Signal generation
Signal generation is based on FingerIO [19] with modifi-
cations tailored to our device and application scenario. We
introduce some additional processing and filtering steps.
Identical to FingerIO, 48 kHz is used as the sampling fre-
quency. According to Nyquist theorem, this supports a sound
wave of up to 24 kHz. This importantly supports frequencies
above 18 kHz, which is the highest frequency most adults
can hear. A vector comprising 64 subcarriers, each covering
375Hz, is composed. All subcarriers outside of the intended
band (18–20kHz) are set to 0, and all others are set to 1.






















Fig. 2 Sonar signal generation. a 128-point vector in frequency domain
and b 64-point signal in time domain
Fig. 3 The sound frame as played continuously over the speakers
The next signal generation steps are in addition to the
mechanism used by FingerIO and are used to adjust to our
phone and application scenario. A copy of the vector is
reverse ordered, and the two vectors concatenated, resulting
in the vector shown in Fig. 2a. The 128-sample time domain
signal is generated using the inverse fast Fourier transform
(IFFT). The real part is divided in half and thefirst half used as
the signal. As this introduces spectral leakage into the audible
hearing range, we remove unwanted low frequencies using
a Hanning window. The final signal in the time domain is
shown in Fig. 2b. The signal is padded with silence to intro-
duce a 264-sample interval and a duration of 5.5ms. This
ensures that all echoes are captured before the next pulse
is emitted. The frame is repeated continuously, producing a
signal as shown in Fig. 3.
We expect that further optimisation is possible. However,
we found the performance to be sufficient for our work.
3.2 Data collection
The phone’smicrophones are used to record sound data using
a sampling frequency of 48 kHz. Noise is introduced by
the environment and is recorded together with the received
OFDM signal. However, ambient noise does not interfere
excessively with the signal processing stage.
3.3 Signal processing
Signal processing comprises (i) echo profile generation, (ii)
noise removal and (iii) feature extraction.
Echo profile creation
Echo data are recorded and transformed into an echo profile
for each present microphone. The processing for each micro-
phone is the same, except for parameter settings taking into
account the positioning of microphones in relation to move-
ment locations. Most modern phones provide at least two
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Fig. 4 The process describes the transformation of the audio signal into
the echo profile vector and finally the echo profile matrix
microphones, one on top of the phone and one on the bot-
tom; we tailor the following process to two microphones, but
the described methods can be extended to more microphone
inputs.
We create the echo profile by calculating the correlation
between the original sound frame and the echo data (see
Fig. 4). The original sound frame is a 64-point signal (64
sample points in the time domain over a duration of 1.3ms).
Therefore, we take 64-point sized chunks from the recorded
echo data and apply a sliding window, shifting 1 point at a
time and calculating the correlation with the original sound
frame. Each correlation result is then concatenated to create
the echo profile vector.
The data emitted on the speakers consist of periodical 264-
point long sound frames, and echoes are observed within
this period. When there is no object movement, echoes will
be observed at the same time within each 264-point frame.
When objects move, echo positions will change within each
following 264-point frame. This can be visualised by trans-
forming the echo profile vector into an echo profile matrix.
We take 264-point sized chunks from the echo profile vector
and transpose them to create the echo profile matrix. Fig-
ure 5a shows an example echo profile matrix. The x-axis and
y-axis of the matrix correspond to time and distance, respec-
tively.
When an object moves, slight variations comparing one
column of the echo profilematrix to the next can be observed.
Depending on the microphone location in relation to the
movement and the speed of moving objects, it is necessary
to compare column i with column i + δ to see clear changes.
For the phone used in our experiments, we set δ = 8 (44ms
































Fig. 5 a Raw echo profile matrix. b Echo profile matrix after column-
wise subtraction. c Echo profile matrix after binarisation and segmen-
tation; blue-coloured bounding boxes indicate detected strokes
separation) for the top microphone. We chose these values
as they provided the best performance for our application
case. Figure 5b shows an example of the echo profile matrix
after subtraction of values in column i and i + δ. The finger
movements are now clearly visible and can be analysed by
suitable algorithms.
Noise removal
Before analysing data captured in the echo profile matrix,
noise is removed. We consider here noise from the sonar
system and not ambient sound, because such ambient noise
does not correlate with our original signal and therefore does
not interferewith the sonar signal analysis. An example result
of this clean up procedure is shown in Fig. 5c which corre-
sponds to the data shown in Fig. 5b.
First, we transform the echo profile matrix into a binary
matrix by setting values above a threshold to 1 and below
to 0. Thus, only correlation above the threshold is taken into
account as this corresponds to significant movements. The
threshold is chosen as the 94th percentile of all the values
in the matrix. We found that this threshold setting performs
well in the context of our work.
We use image processing techniques to extract features
from the echo profile matrix. Thus, our next step of noise
removal is tailored to this method of feature extraction. We
use the concept of connected components (CCs) to detect
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(a) (b) (c) (d)
Fig. 6 Two strokes with different direction information. aA stroke that
is moving away from the bottommicrophone. bConnected components
(CC) of the stroke shown in a extracted from the bottom microphone.
It shows an ascending trend. c A stroke that is moving towards the
bottom microphone. d CC of the stroke in c extracted from the bottom
microphone. It shows a descending trend
areas of activity (corresponding to strokes) in the binary echo
profile matrix. Each CC is defined as area containing more
than 20 connected 1s.We remove all 1s from our echo profile
matrix that are not included in such CCs. Again, a threshold
of 20 was found to be suitable for our application context.
Feature extraction
We use the CCs to locate areas of movement in the binary
echo profile matrix. Each CC is described by a bounding box
(BB) which is the smallest rectangle surrounding the CC as
shown in Fig. 5c. CCs that identify one stroke are grouped
together. For each group of CCs, we extract two features: (i)
movement direction and (ii) movement distance. Movement
direction relates to the angle of lines visible in the CCs of
a group. Movement distance relates to the height of BBs in
each group.
Before extracting features, we exclude some CCs. We
remove CCs that are only visible on one microphone input;
movement should be detected clearly by bothmicrophones at
the same time. We also remove overlapping CCs when more
than half of the smaller CC overlaps in x and y direction.
Thus, the number of CC within a group is reduced, simpli-
fying analysis without loosing accuracy.
CCs are assigned to groups by using a separation of 80
columns (i.e. by 440ms) on the x-axis.Auser pauses between
strokes, and we use this separation to group CCs belonging
to the same stroke. This method relies on a visible pause
at inflections. Other data analysis methods need to be used
to determine CC groups when this cue is not present. We
did experiments during which a user does not need to pause
at each inflection. The results remain similar only except
CCs of different strokes connect together. This fact does
not invalidate our approach, but additional image process-
ing techniques are in need to separate these CCs.
Objects moving away from a microphone produce an
ascending trend in the CC, while objects moving towards
produce a descending trend. Figure 6 gives an example of
this behaviour pattern; two strokes captured by the bottom
Fig. 7 The relation between the
ascending trend of a connected
component and the angle
(orientation) result of Gabor
filter
microphone are shown. The CC in Fig. 6b has an ascend-
ing trend, and the CC in Fig. 6d has a descending trend.
To identify these trends automatically, we use a Gabor fil-
ter [26], which is a well-known linear filter and often used
for extracting orientation information. We quantify the ori-
entation (i.e. the angle) of lines within the CC in each BB
using Gabor filter. If the angle is greater than 90◦ as shown in
Fig. 7, it means that an object is moving away from a micro-
phone, while an angle smaller than 90◦ means that an object
is moving towards the microphone. After obtaining the angle
information of each BB belonging to a stroke, we combine
these into a single value. We weigh the angle information
of each CC by the size of the BB. In the remainder of the
paper, we call this feature representing a stroke’s direction
the angle.
Movement distance can be inferred from the heights of the
BBs within a group. As a group corresponds to a stroke in
our case, the height of each BB contributes to the movement
distance of a stroke. If the stroke is long, the BBs cover more
space vertically. In the remainder of the paper, we refer to
this feature as the range.
3.4 Decision-making
SonarSnoop gathers stroke information via the features angle
and range. This information has to be translated into a mean-
ingful user interaction pattern. Depending on the application,
very different decision-making processes can be appropriate.
We consider in this paper only the task of stealing phone
unlock patterns as described in Sect. 2.3. For this purpose,
we define 3 different decision-making options namedD1, D2
and D3 which operate very differently.
– D1 simply uses the features angle and range and classifies
each stroke. The resulting sequence of strokes is then the
assumed unlock pattern of the user.
– D2 uses only the angle feature of strokes. The sequence
of directions reveals a set of candidate patterns. The set
of candidate patterns is likely to contain the user’s unlock
pattern.
– D3 combines D2 and D1. First, a set of candidates is
determined by investigating the angle feature of strokes.
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1 2 3 4 5
6 7 8 9 10
11 12 13 14 15
Fig. 8 The 15 strokes used to compose the 12 unlock patterns shown
in Fig. 1
Then within the candidate set, angle and range are used
to classify strokes and identify the user’s pattern.
Users do change unlock patterns infrequently, and once
malicious software is deployed on a phone, multiple unlock
procedures can be observed. For each observed unlock
procedure, the decision-making process provides one or
more candidate pattern. All proposed candidate patterns
are ordered according to the number of times they were
suggested. The position of the user’s pattern in the list of
suggested patterns determines the effectiveness of the side-
channel attack.
D1 - classifying strokes using angle and range
Weclassify the strokes usingmachine learning. The sequence
of classified strokes reveals the unlock pattern.We use the 12
most likely unlock pattern as shown in Fig. 1 which decom-
pose into 15 unique strokes as shown in Fig. 8. Sample data
for each of the 15 strokes from 2 individuals (trainers) are
used to train the classifier. Trainers are not subjects of the user
study. We use the direction (angle) and distance (range) of
the strokes obtained from the echo data of both microphones.
There are 3 variants of this decision-making process:
(D1.1) using data from both microphones; (D1.2) using data
from the bottom microphone only; and (D1.3) using data
from the top microphone only.
D2 - grouping patterns using angle
For this method, we use only the direction (angle) of a
stroke, whether it is moving towards a microphone or away.
Then, we look at the combination of the strokes to guess
the pattern. For example, the first stroke of the Pattern 1 in
Fig. 1 is moving away from the bottom microphone and the
second stroke is moving towards the bottom microphone.
Table 1 Groups of patterns that have the same number of strokes with
the samebehaviourswhenusing onemicrophone.Behaviours are shown
as A if the stroke is moving away from the microphone, and T if the
stroke is moving towards to the microphone
Patterns Bottom mic. Patterns Top mic.
1, 4, 7, 8 A - T 1, 2, 4, 5, 8, 11 A - A
2, 5, 6, 11 T - A 3, 10 A - A - A
3, 10 A - T - A 6, 7 A - T
9 A - T - A - A 9 A - A - A - T
12 A - T - T 12 A - A - T
Table 2 Groups of patterns that have the same number of strokes with
the same behaviours when using both microphones. Behaviours are
shown as A if the stroke is moving away from the microphone, and T if
the stroke is moving towards to the microphone
Patterns Bottom microphone Top microphone
1, 4, 8 A - T A - A
2, 5, 11 T - A A - A
3, 10 A - T - A A - A - A
6 T - A A - T
7 A - T A - T
9 A - T - A - A A - A - A - T
12 A - T - T A - A - T
Pattern 4 , Pattern 7 and Pattern 8 have the same behaviour
from the perspective of the bottom microphone. Therefore,
using only angle information, a group of patterns is identi-
fied. Table 1 shows pattern groups for each microphone that
have the same stroke behaviour when considering patterns as
shown in Fig. 1.
The group sizes can be reduced by considering data from
both microphones together. For example, the first stroke of
the Pattern 1 in Fig. 1 ismoving away from the bottommicro-
phone and the second stroke is moving towards the bottom
microphone; considering the top microphone the first and
second stroke are moving away from microphone. Only Pat-
tern 4 and Pattern 8 have this same behaviour. Table 2 shows
pattern groups that have the same stroke behaviour.
It may happen that the analysis of stroke patterns using
angle information of both microphones is inconclusive. For
example, the strokes from the topmicrophone are reported as
moving towards and moving towards, and the strokes from
the bottom microphone are reported as moving away and
moving towards. In this case, no group mapping exists as the
combination cannot be mapped to any entry in Table 2. In
such situation, where no match is possible, we choose to fall
back on data collected from one microphone.
We use four strategies to operate this decision-making
process: (D2.1) using data from both microphones and
using only the bottommicrophone in inconclusive situations;
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Fig. 9 Galaxy S4 used in the experiments. a Location of the bottom
speaker and the bottom microphone. b Location of the top speaker and
the top microphone. c Simplified reflection paths of the bottom speaker
(SB), the top speaker (ST), the echo coming to the bottom microphone
(EB) and the echo coming to the top microphone (ET)
(D2.2) using data from both microphones, using only the
top microphone in inconclusive situations; (D2.3) using data
from the bottom microphone only; (D2.4) using data from
the top microphone only.
D3 - grouping patterns using angle and classifying strokes
using angle and range
We combine the first two approaches to improve the overall
accuracy. We first use method D2 to identify a pattern group,
and then, we select a specific pattern from this group using
methodD1. This approach improves on usingD1 alone as the
pool of candidate patterns is reduced beforemachine learning
is applied. We train machine learning models for the strokes
of each group using corresponding microphone’s data.
Similar to method D2, four different operation modes
can be used: (D3.1) using data from both microphones and
using only the bottommicrophone in inconclusive situations;
(D3.2) using data from both microphones, using only the
top microphone in inconclusive situations; (D3.3) using data
from the bottom microphone only; (D3.4) using data from
the top microphone only.
4 Experimental evaluation of SonarSnoop
We evaluate SonarSnoop using a Samsung Galaxy S4 run-
ning Android 5.0.1. A dedicated evaluation App is used for
a user study to prompt users to input unlock patterns which
we then aim to reveal using SonarSnoop.
4.1 User study
The Samsung Galaxy S4 provides two speakers and two
microphones as shown in Fig. 9. We execute the data col-
lection component of SonarSnoop on the phone. Signal
generation, signal processing and decision-making are exe-
cuted on a dedicated PC.
(a) (b)
Fig. 10 a Screenshot of the App used for our user study. bAn example
demonstration of the user study
For the experiments, we develop a dedicated evaluation
App instead of using the built-in pattern unlock mechanism
of Android. The App replicates the pattern unlock mecha-
nism and provides additional features to simplify evaluation.
The App provides the user with a 9-point matrix to enter
unlock patterns. In addition, the user interface shows the pat-
ternwe expect the user to draw. The user interface is shown in
Fig. 10a. The evaluationApp guides a user through the exper-
iment and ensures that echo data recorded by SonarSnoop
can be matched with the pattern the user was asked to draw
(ground truth).
We ran a user study with 10 volunteers (we obtained
approval for the study from the University Ethics Commit-
tee). Each volunteer was asked to draw each of the 12 unlock
patterns as shown in Fig. 1 five times. The evaluation App
guided the volunteers through this process which took up to
30 min.
The participant is asked to hold the phone with one hand
and to draw the pattern with the other. The participants sat at
a table and rest the arm holding the phone with their elbow
on the table (see Fig. 10b).
All experimentation was carried in an open plan office
without restrictions on the environment noise. During our
experiment, usual office noise was present (people moving,
chatting, moving chairs, opening doors). The results shows
that our approach is fairly robust against such environment
noise.
4.2 Evaluationmetrics
Using the data collected in our user study, we evaluate the
three different variants of our decision-making process. To
judge performance, we use five key metrics:
– Pattern guess rate per user (M1): For each user, we cal-
culate the ratio of successfully retrieved patterns to the
number of patterns in the pool (i.e. 12). A pattern is suc-
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Fig. 11 Classification accuracies for 15 strokes shown in Fig. 8 for 10
users
cessfully retrieved if the decision-making suggests a set
of patterns which contains the correct one.
– Pattern candidates per user (M2): Without the aid of our
side-channel attack, the attacker must perform a random
guess (i.e. selecting randomly from a pool of 12 patterns
in our case). This metric describes the average size of
the pattern pool after the decision-making per user. If the
size of the remaining pattern candidate pool is reduced,
it will improve pattern guess rate.
– Pattern guess rate per pattern (M3): This metric is similar
to M1. However, the rate of success is per pattern instead
of per user. The metric shows how successful a specific
pattern is retrieved across all users within our study.
– Pattern candidates per pattern (M4): Thismetric is similar
to M2. Here the average size of the pattern pool after
decision-making is calculated per pattern across all users
in the study.
– Attack attempts (M5): This metric is based onM2. How-
ever, the unlock patterns are ordered by the number of
times they were suggested. This gives the sequence of
patterns an attacker will try. M5 is the position of the
user’s pattern in this ordered pattern pool.
4.3 Decision-making option D1
With this decision-making variant, we classify the individual
strokes of the patterns and then deduce the pattern from the
result (see Sect. 3.4). Figure 8 shows the 15 unique strokes
of the 12 patterns shown in Fig. 1 which are elements of
our study. We train our machine learning model using data
obtained from 2 trainers. We collect between 30 and 40
samples in total for each stroke. We test various algorithms
using fivefold cross-validation on the training data and pick
Medium Gaussian SVM algorithm with kernel scale param-
eter 2.2, as it performs best among other algorithms in terms
of accuracy.
Figure 11 shows the classification accuracies for the 15
strokes shown in Fig. 8 for 10 users that participated in our
study. The figure shows accuracies for each user with dif-
ferent combinations of feature sets. Using both microphones
gives the best performance as we would expect. The highest
accuracy value of 0.37 is achieved with User 8 when using







































Fig. 12 Results per user with decision method D1. a Pattern guess rate
(Metric M1). b Average number of pattern candidates remained after
predictions (Metric M2)
both microphones. We obtain the best overall average accu-
racy when using both microphones (accuracy of 0.29).
Next we combine the classified strokes to guess the users’
pattern. Figure 12a shows the pattern guess rate per user
(Metric M1). The rate is shown using variation D1.1, D1.2
and D1.3 of our decision-making method D1. As a reflection
of the results shown Fig. 11, we obtain the best rate of 0.33
for User 8 when using data from both microphones, and the
best average value of 0.18 across all users is also achieved
when using both microphones.
Figure 12b shows the average number of candidate pat-
terns remained after predictions for each user (Metric M2).
A minimum number of candidates of 8.83 is achieved when
using both microphones for User 8, and we obtain the min-
imum average value of 10.28 when using both microphone
across the user population.
Figure 13a shows pattern guess rate across all users for
each pattern (MetricM3).Although the average rate of 0.18 is
achieved when using both microphones, Pattern 5 is revealed
for 9 users within 5 iterations.
Figure 13b shows the average number of candidates
remained after predictions for each pattern (Metric M4). The
minimumvalue of 3.20 is achievedwith Pattern 5when using
both microphones. We obtain the minimum average value of
10.28 when using both microphones.
Summary The results show that methodD1 reduces the can-
didate pool of patterns (MetricsM2,M4). Thus, we show that
the acoustic side-channel is generally useful to an attacker.
However, the improvement is not very significant. The aver-
age number of candidate patterns for the attacker to try is
reduced from 12 to 10.28 (Metrics M2, M4).
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Fig. 13 Results per pattern with decision method D1. a Pattern guess
rate (Metric M3). b Average number of pattern candidates remained
after predictions (Metric M4)









































Fig. 14 Results per user with decision method D2. a Pattern guess rate
(Metric M1). b Average number of pattern candidates remained after
predictions (Metric M2)
4.4 Decision-making option D2
With this decision-making variant, we identify candidate
groups based on the angle information. Some patterns share
the same number of movements with the same behaviours
(moving away or moving towards), and we cannot narrow
the decision down to a single pattern.
Table 2 shows groups of patterns that have the same num-
ber of movements with same behaviours when using both
microphones.
The rates (MetricM1) as shown in Fig. 14a are above 0.83
for all users when using both microphones (D2.1 and D2.2).
The patterns of Users 2, 6, 7, 8 and 10 are mapped to their









































Fig. 15 Results per pattern with decision method D2. a Pattern guess
rate (Metric M3). b Average number of pattern candidates remained
after predictions (Metric M4)
groups shown in Table 2 with 100% success when using both
microphones, and the best average value of 0.93 for M1 is
achieved when using both microphones (D2.1 and D2.2).
The minimum number of candidates as shown in Fig. 14b
(Metric M2) of 3.50 is achieved for User 2, and we obtain
the minimum average value of 4.44 when using only bottom
microphone’s data (D2.3).
Most of the patterns are mapped to their correct groups
(Metric M3 shown in Fig. 15a), and an overall average value
of 0.93 is achieved when using the data from both micro-
phones (D2.1 and D2.2).
The average number of candidates remained after predic-
tions for each pattern is shown in Fig. 15b (Metric M4). A
minimum value of 2.30 is achieved for Pattern 12when using
both microphones and the bottom microphone is dominant
(D2.1). We obtain the minimum average value when using
only the bottom microphone (D2.3) which is 4.44.
Summary D2 performs significantly better than D1. The
number of pattern candidates is significantly reduced from
12 to 4.4 (Metrics M2, M4). This is an interesting result as
this method uses only one feature (angle) for the decision-
making. However, the attacker still has more than one
candidate due to similarities of patterns and their grouping.
4.5 Decision-making option D3
Here we first map a pattern into a group of patterns by look-
ing at the directions using method D2. The results are then
narrowed down further by classifying the unique strokes of
the patterns within a group. For this classification, machine
learning models for each group are required. For method D1,
wehad 15 different strokes that need training for the decision-
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Table 3 Groups of unique
strokes to be trained for each
pattern group when using both
microphones, only bottom
microphone and only top
microphone
Both microphones Bottom microphone Top microphone
Patterns Strokes Patterns Strokes Patterns Strokes
1, 4, 8 2, 5, 6 1, 4, 6, 8 2, 5, 6, 9 1, 2, 4, 5, 8, 11 1, 3, 5, 14
2, 5, 11 3, 5, 14 2, 5, 6, 11 3, 5, 7, 14 1, 2, 4, 5, 8, 11 2, 4, 5, 6
3, 10 1, 11 2, 5, 6, 11 4, 8 3, 10 1, 11
3, 10 5, 12 3, 10 1, 11 3, 10 5, 12
3, 10 4, 13 3, 10 5, 12 3, 10 4, 13
3, 10 4, 13 6, 7 1, 7
6, 7 8, 9
























Fig. 16 Average number of pattern candidates remained after predic-
tions for each user (Metric M2) with decision method D3
makingmethodD1. For themethodD3, the number of unique
strokes within each group is less than 15, which will be less
challenging for the machine learning models. Therefore, we
expected that the algorithm performance will be better than
the one in Sect. 4.3.
The groups of patterns that have the same number of
strokes with the same behaviours are shown in Table 2. These
groups are created using the data of both microphones. For
the method D3, we sometimes use only one of the micro-
phone’s data as fallback. Therefore, we need to take into
account the patterns that are grouped together when using
only one of the microphone’s data, which are shown in
Table 1. We analyse the patterns within each group shown in
Tables 1 and 2, then filter out the common strokes of all pat-
terns within this group and only list the unique strokes within
each group. For instance, Strokes 2, 5 and 6 are unique for
each pattern (Patterns 1, 4 and 8) of the first group shown in
Table 2. Unique stroke groups to be trained for each pattern
group when using both microphones, only bottom micro-
phone and only top microphone are shown in Table 3. We
create machine learning models for the strokes of each group
using the correspondingmicrophone’s data. Variousmachine
learning algorithms are applied to training data using fivefold
cross-validation, andMediumGaussian SVM algorithmwith
kernel scale parameter 2.2 is chosen for decision-making
over users’ data.
D3 is an extension of D2, and therefore, the rates achieved
(Metric M1 and M3) are the same for D2 and D3. How-
ever, the additional processing after identifying candidate
sets reduces the pattern candidate sets further (Metric M2
























Fig. 17 Average number of pattern candidates remained after predic-
tions for each pattern (Metric M4) with decision method D3
and M4). We therefore present next the results regarding M2
and M4.
The average number of candidates remained after pre-
dictions for each user (Metric M2) is shown in Fig. 16. A
minimum number of candidates of 2.5 is achieved for User 8.
We obtain the minimum average value of 3.6 for D3.1 when
looking across all users.
Figure 17 shows the average number of candidates
remained after predictions for each pattern (Metric M4). The
minimumnumber of candidates of 1 is achieved for Patterns 1
and 11when using the data frombothmicrophones (D3.1 and
D3.2), which means we just need one attempt to guess these
two patterns. We obtain the minimum average value of 3.6
using method D3.1.
Summary Using this method, we can reduce the pattern
candidate pool in some cases from 12 to 1 (Metric M4).
When looking across all patterns, this method D3 improves
on D2. The number of pattern candidates is reduced from
4.4 to 3.6 (Metric M2 andM4). Moreover, the average attack
attempt value of 2.71 is achieved when using method D3.2
(Metric M5).
5 Discussions
Our experimental evaluation shows that the active acoustic
side-channel is in principle a useful instrument for reveal-
ing user interaction patterns on phones. However, our study
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and the components of SonarSnoop have limitations and
improvements are possible.
5.1 Algorithm performance
D1 is themost generic method, identifying individual strokes
and composing these into patterns. The method helps to
reduce an attackers effort in guessing the unlock pattern.
However, the method does not yield very good results. The
average number of candidate patterns that the attacker has to
try is reduced from 12 to 10.28.
D2 is much better and provides an average reduction from
12 to 4.4 patterns. This result is achieved by analysing less
features from the collected sound data thanmethodD1 (based
only on direction of fingermovement). However, D2 requires
us to decide on a pool of patterns beforehand. This is a limi-
tation D1 is not bound to; however, in practice this may not
be problematical as the pool of likely patterns is known [10].
D3 improves on D2 by combining D1 and D2. Patterns
are grouped, and thereafter, the method used in D1 is applied
to narrow down the pattern candidate pool further. D3 pro-
vides an average reduction from12 to 3.6 pattern (D2 reduces
these from 12 to 4.4). Although D3 requires reasonably more
computational effort, it gives better results than D2.
5.2 Limitations and improvements
The acoustic signal generation can be improved. We believe
it is possible to reduce the silence period in between pulses
to achieve better resolution. The current gap size between
pulses ensures reflections can be received from up to 1m
distance before the next pulse is emitted. Given that we are
interested in movement on the screen in close proximity, we
can reduce this gap. Also, different signal shapes might be
possible that improve system performance.
For convenience and simplicity, we do not implement the
system to cope with different users interaction speeds. We
use a fixed column width of the echo profile matrix to deter-
mine whether there is movement. We calibrated the system
to work well with most users. However, if a user draws a
pattern very slowly, the differential echo profile matrix may
not reveal movements, since the rate of change is too slow
to be detected. An improved implementation could support
an adaptive feature to adjust with vastly different interaction
speeds. Nevertheless, our method is applicable for practical
scenarios since we have observed that people draw patterns
consistently fast.
We proposed three decision-making strategies. The algo-
rithms sufficiently demonstrate that the active acoustic side-
channel attack is feasible. However, we believe it is possible
to design better decision-making strategies. For example,
additional features could be extracted from the recorded
sound data to provide a better basis for decisions. Also, dif-
ferent methods for analysing the existing features (angle and
direction) are possible.
SonarSnoop in its current form relies on clear separation
of strokes within a pattern. When users do not pause at an
inflection, it is currently impossible to distinguish individ-
ual strokes. In our user study, we asked users to pause at
inflections. We aim to extend the system with methods for
automatic separation of strokes. This can be achieved by
analysing angle changes within individual connected com-
ponent (CC).
Our user study has limitations. We had 10 users that were
asked to draw 12 patterns 5 times. While the study provided
sufficient data to analyse SonarSnoop, it would be useful to
expand the data set, e.g. with a greater variety of patterns and
with these entered more than 5 times by the users.
6 Attack generalisation and
countermeasures
SonarSnoop can do more than stealing unlock patterns on
phones. This approach can be applied to other scenarios and
device types, and SonarSnoop represents a new family of
security threats.
6.1 Attack generalisation
SonarSnoop canbe expanded to support different interactions
and device types.
SonarSnoop can be extended to observe different user
interactions such as gestures or typing on a phone’s virtual
keyboard. Recognising simple gestures (such as swipe left
or right as used for Tinder) would be relatively simple to dis-
cern while identifying different key presses on a keyboard is
more challenging. Adaptation to different interaction types
will enable new side-channel attacks on specific applications.
Our experiment observes user interactions with a touch
screen. However, SonarSnoop can be extended to observe
user behaviour in some distance to the phone. For example,
FingerIO has used a similar approach to observe gestures
a meter away from the speaker/microphone. Thus, a phone
could be used to observe user interaction with a device (e.g.
an ATM) other than the phone itself.
In our study, acoustic emitter and receiver are located in
the same device, and situations where these two components
are separate should be considered. It is not uncommon that
phones are just put aside people’s laptops when they work.
In this case, speakers on the phone can act as emitter while
microphones on the laptop canwork as receiver, or vice versa.
Similarly, devices do not need to be limited only to phones
and laptops. Any devices with microphones and speakers
such as tablets and phones, smart watches, cameras or voice
assistants are candidates.
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6.2 New attack scenarios
We envisage a number of new attack scenarios that extend
our experiment.
Stealing personal preferences: Tinder, the popular social
search App, helps strangers to socialise with each other. It
supports a filter mechanism that two people can only start
chatting if they both like each other’s profile picture. Tinder
treats a user’s ‘right swipe’ actions as like and ‘left swipe’ as
dislike. These swipe actions can be easily differentiated by
SonarSnoop.
More and more human gestures are incorporated into the
so-called natural user interaction with various computing
devices. Our Tinder attack suggests numerous new possi-
bilities for stealing people’s sensitive personal preferences
via spying on their gestures.
Combo attacks: SonarSnoop can be extended to use addi-
tional sensor inputs to boost performance. The combination
of multiple sensing inputs has been used successfully in the
past. For instance, Simon et al. make use of the front phone
camera and microphone recording to infer personal identi-
fication numbers (PINs) [23]. They use the front camera to
record a video when people input, by tapping on the screen,
PINs. The recorded acoustic signal helps to identify frames
in which a PIN is entered. Machine learning is used to iden-
tify the pressed number in the identified frames. Narain et al.
combine a gyroscope and microphone to unveil PINs [21].
Sound and gyroscopes data are used to detect finger tap loca-
tion on the virtual keyboard or PIN pad.
SonarSnoop can be augmented similarly. For example,
data from sensors such as gyroscopes, accelerometers or
cameras could be combined with the active sonar approach.
It is also possible to use a combination of approaches based
on the acoustic channel. Specifically, active and passive
approaches can be combined. If passive and our active acous-
tic side-channel analyses are combined, tapping information
(timing and location) and finger movement information
(movement distance and movement direction between taps)
can be extracted. Such more fine-grained data collection will
allow us to infer user interaction with greater detail.
Espionage: Installing hidden acoustic bugs say in an
embassy has been a commonpractice in the intelligence com-
munity. This old-fashioned eavesdropping method, when
combinedwith SonarSnoop, will have new advantages. First,
the combined use turns a passive eavesdropping into an active
one. Second, cautious people know the necessity of play-
ing loud music or otherwise introducing background noise
to mitigate the eavesdropping bugs. However, this common
countermeasure does little to defend against SonarSnoop,
since it is robust to ambient noise.
6.3 Countermeasures
Themain feature that enables SonarSnoop is the transmission
and reception of inaudible sound. Different hardware and
software solutions are possible to interfere with this feature
and to prevent an acoustic active side-channel attack.
Sound system design: Devices could be constructed such
that transmission of inaudible signals is simply impossible.
After all, the intended purpose of a speaker system is to com-
municate with people who should be able to hear the sound.
Supporting the very high frequency range might be useful
for high-quality sound systems (e.g. concert halls) but is per-
haps unnecessary for simple appliances (e.g. phones or smart
TVs). The frequency range that the hardware supports can
be restricted to mitigate the threat of SonarSnoop, but this is
not viable for already existing systems.
Sound notification: Software or hardware can be used to
notify users of a present sound signal in the high frequency
range.Users can be alerted by anLEDor by a pop-up notifica-
tion. This can enable users to realise an active side-channel’s
presence.
Jamming: Another option is to actively disable side-
channels. Jamming can actively render side-channels useless
to an attacker. For example, Nandakumar et al. proposed to
jam acoustic signals in the inaudible range [20]. A device can
be designed to monitor acoustic channel activities and, once
a threat situation is detected, enable jamming. Alternatively,
application software can actively generate noise within the
acoustic channelwhen sensitive tasks are executed (e.g.when
a banking App requests a PIN).
Sound system off switch: A sound system (or either micro-
phones or speakers individually) could be disabled during
sensitive operations. Either the device provides features that
allows software to disable the sound system when needed or
a method is provided that allows the user to disable it. For
example, a device could provide a switch (the equivalent to
a mechanical camera cover) to enable users to control the
capability of the device.
Among these countermeasures, no singlemethod fits in all
situations. Probably, a stand-alone appliance which can jam
in the inaudible frequency range has a best defence capability.
However, this approach might not be very user friendly as
people need carry an extra device with them.
6.4 Wider impact
A core attacker activity is to study user interaction with sys-
tems. The simplest approach here is to follow a victim and
observe their actions, for example, to observe a victim enter-
ing a PIN code at an ATM. However, people are quite aware
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that this might happen and take precautions. An attacker
therefore may use a more covert approach and may use a
camera for observation. Either a camera is deployed for this
purpose or an existing camera is repurposed for this task.
For example, the attacker places a camera on the ATM or
uses existing CCTV equipment. However, people have also
become aware of this attacker approach and are cautious. It
is common practice to cover camera lenses on a laptop with a
sticker and to be aware of cameraswhen performing sensitive
tasks.
Most devices, including numerous IoT systems, have
nowadays a high-end acoustic system. Phones, smart TVs,
voice assistants such as Amazon Echo and Google Home
have multiple high-end speakers and microphones incorpo-
rated. As our study has demonstrated, it is possible to use
these systems to gather very detailed information on user
behaviour. The information is not yet as detailed as what is
possible with optical systems but sufficient to obtain very
detailed behaviour profiles. Users are not aware of the capa-
bility of sound systems. You would not consider that the
presence of a sound system is problematic when carrying
out sensitive tasks. People may be wary that conversations
are recorded, but they certainly lack awareness that the sound
system can be used for observation of movements.
Clearly, this type of threat should be considered. People
need to be made aware and the threat should be considered
when designing systems.
7 Related work
Our work is the first to propose an active acoustic side-
channel attack. It can be a side-channel on phones and on
other computing devices where speakers and microphones
are available. Closely related work can be divided into three
categories. The first category investigates side-channels on
phones and wearable devices. The second category explores
acoustic side-channel attacks. The third category aims to
achieve device-free tracking via acoustics, using the exist-
ing speaker and microphones in mobile devices.
7.1 Side channels onmobile devices
A large body ofwork on side-channel attacks exists, exposing
user data via readings of sensors on phones and wearable
devices. For instance, work exists on revealing user data, e.g.
PINor graphical passwords through reading of accelerometer
data [3,17,18]. Spreitzer et al. [24] provide a comprehensive
survey and systematic analysis of this line of work. It clearly
supports our claim that our work is the first active acoustic
side-channel attack.
7.2 Acoustic side-channel attacks
Obtaining information via an acoustic side-channel is not
new. However, existing work mostly utilises acoustic signals
passively.
Backes et al. [4] recover the printed content of a dot-matrix
printer by analysing printing noise. Faruque et al. [12] recon-
struct the object printed by a 3Dprinter via the emitted sound.
Hojjati et al. [15] demonstrate attacks on a 3D printers and a
CNC mills using audio and magnetometer data. Other sim-
ilar work in the manufacturing space is detailed in [5,9].
Toreini et al. [25] decode the keys pressed on an Enigma
machine by analysing the emitted sound. Genkin et al. [14]
reveal 4096-bit RSA keys using acoustic signals generated
by a computer.
There is another group of study focusing on recovering
keystrokes on physical or virtual keyboards via acoustics.
Cai et al. [7] surveyed potential attacks using microphones.
Asonov et al. [1] present an acoustic attack to classify key
presses on a physical keyboard. Zhuang et al. [34] further
improved this work. Berger et al. [6] present a dictionary
attack based on keyboard acoustic emanations. Compagno
et al. [11] infer text typed on a keyboard through the acous-
tic signal captured via Skype chat. Liu et al. [16] use two
microphones on a smartphone to inference presses on a key-
board. Narain et al. [21] use a gyroscope andmicrophones on
amobile phone to predict keystrokes on the virtual keyboard.
All these were acoustic side-channel attacks, but they did
not use an active sonar system as we do.
7.3 Device-free acoustic tracking
There is a wealth of work achieving human tracking through
RF signals. For example, Wilson et al. [29] use Wi-Fi for
tracking. There is existing work in the HCI area focusing on
using acoustic signals for tracking finger/hand movements
without extra devices [19,28,31].
Nandakumar et al. [19] are related to our work; we base
our sonar signal generation on their work. Nandakuma et
al. [20] examined the security (more accurately, privacy)
implication of tracking human movements with acoustics in
a recent study. However, its security and privacy implication
was largely a single-bit information, e.g. whether someone
was in a room or not, or whether she was moving or standing
still. This creates an effective covert channel leaking people’s
privacy information, but it barely constitutes a side-channel
attack.
Our work is different from the existing work in two main
aspects. First, the application scenario is different; existing
work does not study finger movement on the screen of the
phone. Second, existingwork does not explore the possibility
of stealing sensitive data from users via the acoustic system.
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8 Conclusion
We have developed a novel acoustic side-channel attack.
Unlike the prior approaches where acoustic signals are pas-
sively created by a victim user or computer, we repurpose
a computer device’s acoustic system into a sonar system.
Thereby, an attacker actively beams human inaudible acous-
tic signals into an environment. The echo stream received
not only allows the attacker to stealthily observe a user’s
behaviour, but also creates a side-channel that leaks her secu-
rity secrets.
With this active acoustic side-channel, our attack could
significantly reduce the number of trials required to success-
fully guess a victim’s unlock pattern on an Android phone.
We have noted that attackers do not have to limit them-
selves to use only smartphones. Instead, our attack appears
to be applicable in any environment where microphones and
speakers can interact in a way that is similar to our experi-
mental setting.
Thus, our work starts a new line of inquiry, with fertile
grounds for future research. For example, it is interesting
to investigate and qualify the effectiveness of our attack in
different scenarios, and to explore the best countermeasures
for each of the scenarios. We also expect our work to inspire
novel attacks in the future.
While it helps to improve user experience by tracking
human movements and gestures via sound waves or the like,
this approach can have a significant security consequence.
Unfortunately, this lesson had been largely ignored in the
previous research for long. Because of the growing popular-
ity of these invisible ‘sensing’ technologies, the lesson we
have learned here is significant.
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